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1 Introduction
Economists are divided on the issue whether banking competition is valuable and benets consumers
or whether it is harmful and pushes banks into excessively risky activities. This theoretical debate
has gained even more importance after the recent banking crises. To test these theories empirically,
however, one must rst identify the level of competition in the banking sector. Reduced form, non-
structural models (conjectural variation, Panzar-Rosse test) all have their problems1 and cannot
identify reliably the level of competition. Moreover, these methodologies are not useful to test policy
and welfare implications because the reduced form parameters change with policy (as the Lucas
critique suggests.)
This paper studies the competitive behavior in the Italian retail banking industry, using a struc-
tural model of demand and supply sides of the deposit market. We focus on competition in net
interest rates and branching across all regions and use a non-nested test to identify the model that
describes best the Italian banksconduct. Besides the standard competition with di¤erentiated prod-
ucts and perfect collusion models, we also consider partially collusive models based on the degree of
bank size and multi-market contact.
Previous structural banking papers typically assume that banks compete in a di¤erentiated prod-
uct market by choosing interest rates given their number of branches and other characteristics. Dick
(2008) is the rst paper to estimate a nested logit model2 for retail deposit services using data on U.S.
commercial banks. She derives consumer welfare but does not test market power3. A di¤erent set of
papers use structural demand models to test for market power in the banking industry. Ho (2008),
Molnar (2008), Molnar et al. (2007) and Nakane et al. (2006) employ similar techniques to estimate
not only demand but also market power on the supply side in the Chinese, Finnish, Hungarian and
Brazilian retail banking, both on the deposit and on the loan side. These papers focus on short term,
static competition and infer the form of the strategic conduct from the estimated own and cross-price
elasticities and the marginal costs estimates.
Our paper, in line with the literature, combines the structural demand and supply models. Our
main contributions, however, relative to the previous papers are that we employ non-nested tests (as
in Gasmi et al., 1992) for the market power on the Italian retail deposit market and we consider not
only the two extremes, a competitive and a perfectly collusive model of the supply, but also partially
collusive models where the collusive groups are formed based on the number of deposit market
coverage or overlap. We model partial collusion as a perfectly collusive cartel with a competitive
fringe and use pairwise tests to examine which model ts the data best. Of course the number of
1See for example Reiss and Wolak (2005).
2Developed by Berry (1994).
3Since Dick, a few more papers applied the discrete-choice demand framework (nested or random coe¢ cient logit)
to analyze di¤erent questions in banking including Adams et al. (2007), Grzelonska (2005), Ishii (2005), Knittel and
Stango (2008), Zhou (2008), all use U.S. demand deposits data.
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theoretically possible collusive arrangements is very large due to the large number of banks so we
need to limit the number of models we consider. We test collusive models based on multi-market
contact, and deposit weighted multi-market contact. Multi-market contact is one of those factors
which can facilitate and sustain implicit collusion as it was shown by Bernheim andWhinston (1990)4.
For example, a potential partial (tacit or explicit, empirically not distinguishable,) collusion may be
composed of banks with coverage or overlap on more than two markets. We test these partial cartels
(that includes banks with similar market overlap) against each other, against the perfect cartel and
Nash-Bertrand competition.
The existing empirical studies that relate the level of collusion and rivalry directly to multi-
market contact mostly nd that multi-market contact increases prices and protability, and decreases
competition (e.g. Parker and Röller (1997) in mobile phones, Leheyda (2008) in the auto industry).
Davis and Huse (2010) and Sabbatini (2006) adopt a di¤erent approach to evaluate coordination
in merger simulations. They consider tacit collusion with a grim-trigger punishment strategy and
one extension is to examine the impact of multi-market contact. By contrast, we do not specify the
punishment path. We implicitly assume that the punishment is monotonically related to the market
coverage or multi-market contact. That is cartels that feature more multi-market contacts are more
stable due to the increased ability to punish those agents that deviate from the collusive (implicit or
explicit) agreement.
In reduced form models, De Bonis and Ferrando (2000) and Coccorese and Pellecchia (2009)
studied multi-market contact in the Italian banking industry. Both studies use more disaggregated
level data (Italian province level) than in our study (Italian region level.) De Bonis and Ferrando
(2000) nd that geographical overlap in banking is positively correlated with changes in market
shares and lower lending rates, conrming the hypothesis of an overall increase in competition within
the Italian banking system in the nineties. Coccorese and Pellecchia (2009) nd that in the period
20022005 protability is positively related to the average number of contacts among banks, and
appear to be higher for those credit institutions experiencing more links. They conclude that the
increasing consolidation (and hence the growing number of interactions in local markets) that has
characterized this sector in those years were harmful for consumers and decreased competition in the
Italian banking industry.
Similarly to Coccorese and Pellecchia (2009), we nd that banks with an extensive multi-market
contacts (at least 19 out of the 20 local markets) tend to be less competitive, pay lower deposit rates
and behave as if they were maximizing their prot jointly taking into account the competitive fringe
of smaller banks. We also estimate the welfare implication of this less than competitive behavior. In
general we nd that in the majority of the regions, the depositorswelfare per euro deposit decreased
4Their main idea is that when rms compete in multiple markets, they can punish deviation from tacit collusion
more severely in all markets. As a result, in some circumstances, tacit collusion may be sustainable in markets where
it otherwise would not be if rms did not have multi-market contact.
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from 2003 to 2007, but the total consumer welfare increased due to the increased market size (nancial
assets) amounts. The depositorswelfare increased by about 10.5 billion euro or by 2.63 billions per
year. In 2007, however, depositorswelfare would have been higher by about 1.80 billion euro if the
banking sector were more competitive on the deposit services market. It is equivalent of a 13 basis
point di¤erence between the net deposit rates under the two alternative scenarios although the net
deposit rate is not the only component of the depositorswelfare.
While the depositorswelfare seems to be higher under the counterfactual scenario our model
need to be further extended to explore policy implications. Our paper provides a better approach
to measure the competitiveness of the banking sector but it does not take into account the multi-
product feature of the banking industry (most importantly the loan market and the potential cross-
subsidization between di¤erent products) and does not take into account the potential trade-o¤
between competition and stability of the banking system. Further research is necessary to include
risk-taking into our model to enable us to draw rm policy conclusions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Italian banking industry.
Section 3 discusses describes the building blocks of the structural model. Section 4 presents the
estimation strategy along with the identifying assumptions and the data. Section 5 presents the
results of the estimation and robustness checks. Finally, section 6 provides conclusion.
2 Italian banking sector
2.1 Background
During the last 20 years, Italian banking has gone through a process of consolidation common to all
European banking systems. Although this process has led to a sharp improvement of the sectors
e¢ ciency, banks have reacted to the sharper competition by cutting costs and expanding in size, often
by merging with competitors. While the 1990s experienced a large number of mergers creating a few
large regional institutions, as well as national banks, smaller local banks still dominate local deposit
markets. These consolidations decreased the number of banking institutions but the deregulation
of branching activities almost doubled the number of bank branches. The number of Italian banks
decreased from 1064 in 1990 to 788 in 2009 while the number of branches increased from 17,721
to 34,036 respectively. At the end of 2009 the average number of inhabitants per branch is 1,610
nationally (1,320 in the Centre and North and 2,690 in the South.) 25 banks listed on the stock
exchange; and the listed banking groups account for 64.3 per cent of Italian banks assets. As
documented in Cerasi et al. (2000), as a result of reforms on entry and branching regulation, the
cost of branching in Italy has decreased signicantly.
The mergers and acquisitions of the last decade have led to an increase in the degree of concen-
tration of the banking system nationwide: between 2000 and 2009, the Herndahl-Hirschman Index
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(HHI), calculated on the total assets of the units operating in Italy, increased from 600 to 760 (on
a scale of 10,000). However, in the same period the degree of concentration of local credit markets
decreased. The average number of banks per province rose from 25 to 27. About 90 percent of the
Italian population can choose from among at least three banks in their town of residence.
The two major groups (UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo) hold 33.9 per cent of the banking systems
assets in Italy, while the other three medium-sized/large groups (Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena,
Banco Popolare and Unione di Banche Italiane) account for 18.6 per cent. A third category comprises
51 medium-sized/ small groups and stand-alone banks (including specialized banks and subsidiaries
of foreign banking groups), with 35 per cent of total assets; the remaining 12.5 per cent is held by
590 small intermediaries with prevalently local operations (Bank of Italy, 2010).
Between 1990 and 2004 a total of 620 M&As were recorded, involving more than half of the total
assets of the Italian banking system. The overall impact of these developments deregulation and
consolidation on bank competition is a priori ambiguous. The existing academic literature has in
general indicated that competition among European banks has increased only modestly as a result
of deregulation. The Italian liberalization experience, on the other hand, suggests a stronger impact
of barrier-to-entry removal in shaping a competitive banking sector environment (e.g. Angelini and
Cetorelli (2003), Cetorelli and Violi (2005), and Focarelli and Panetta (2003)). Cost-price estimates
suggest that M&As operations have improved bankse¢ ciency, and that such improvements have at
least in part been passed on to bankscustomers.
The Italian Competition Authority (ICA) launched several inquiries (i.e in 2006 and 2011) to
determine the kinds and the extent of the user charges applied to banking services. They investigated
current accounts, deposit services (such as bills of exchange and standing orders), and payment
services (transfers, bancomat and pre-paid bancomat). According to the ICA, various complaints and
a number of studies by foreign institutions (such as a European Commission study (2006)), consumer
associations and consultants have highlighted the existence of high prices for banking services in Italy.
This may indicate weak competitive forces in the market, to the detriment of consumers.
2.2 Data and Market Denition
We obtained our data from four main sources. Interest rates and the value of outstanding deposits
come from the Central Credit Register (CCR) and Banks balance sheet and income statement
information come from the Banking Supervision Register (BSR). Both registers are managed by the
Bank of Italy. Interest rate data classication and compilation criteria are harmonized according to
the European Central Bank (ECB) statistical reporting system for Monetary Financial Institutions
(MFI). The Central Credit Register is a department of the Banca dItalia that collects data on the
interest rates above a certain threshold. The Banking Supervision Register also provides the data on
the deposits of individual banks in each region, with a breakdown by size of the deposit and type of
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depositor. Finally, we supplement these data with region-specic indicators, such as the number of
new banks entering each local market.
We dene the geographic market as a region in Italy, totally 20 regions. In dealing with merger
cases, the Italian Competition Authority considers the province as the relevant geographic market,
as far as the market for deposits were to be concerned; with regards to loans, the relevant market is
considered to be the region. It would be ideal that we dene the geographic market as a province.
Unfortunately, the regional level was the nest geographic data that we could get access to. Our
choice has been driven by data availability but one can also argue that in recent years the structural
changes within the banking sector (deregulation, online banking higher customer mobility, technolog-
ical progress) could have widened the boundaries of the relevant geographic market also for deposit
services. Moreover, since we do not have regional variation in the interest rates, the market denition
probably has no impact on the estimated interest rate elasticities.
The total market is dened as the total nancial assets.5 The inside market shares are dened on
the basis of euro deposit data collected at each bank in each region in Italy.
The sample is from 2003 to 2007. We drop observations with missing variables or average service
rate greater than 10% or banks with deposits in a region less than 10; 000 Euros. Table 1 presents
the summary of statistics on the bank-year level, bank-region-year level, and market level. The data
cover 5 years, 20 regions, and 105; 104; 103; 103; 102 banks in years 2003 to 2007 respectively. The
average (median) number of banks per market is about 31 (28:5). The market shares show that
the Italian banking system is still rather fragmented with numerous small banks. (The mean within
market share is 3:2%.)
3 Model
We consider a structural model of demand and supply of retail deposit services. We think of retails
banks as service providers that are di¤erentiated in terms of observed and unobserved (by the econo-
metrician) characteristics such as observed interest rates, service fees, number of branches versus
unobserved reputation, bundling of products, advertising etc. In the baseline model, on the demand
side we use the specication of Dick (2008) and assume that consumers are interested in purchasing
deposit services from a single bank. Similarly to Dick (2008), data limitations drive a number of
modelling choices, but seems unlikely to signicantly a¤ect the interpretation of the results.
Following Berry (1994), from individual consumer utility maximization one can aggregate and
relate an aggregate market share as a function of observed and unobserved product characteristics.
We use instruments for the endogenous prices (in this application net deposit interest rates), the
5The data are from the Bank of Italys survey on income and wealth which has a regional breakdown of real and
nancial assets held by Italian household. For robustness check we have also explored two other total market denitions
such as total wealth of households that included also real assets and the total deposits in all monetary institution.
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number of branches within regions and for the nest shares in the demand estimation.
On the supply side we consider deposit-taking retail banks, which are primarily used to generate
revenue through the funding of various credit instruments. These banks are therefore multiproduct
rms; however, this paper focuses only on the deposit side of the banking industry and does not
explicitly model any decisions on the lending side. We assume that each bank chooses a single net
price (service fees - interest rates on deposits) to maximize its total prots over the whole country
conditional on their and their rivals characteristics (branch network size, age, number of regions
they operate) and the deposit return rate. The deposit return rate, dened as the return that each
bank can achieve on the deposit amounts by lending etc., depends on the bank characteristics and
year-bank dummies. Even though the banks charge national interest rates, deposit return rates could
vary region-by-region due to the di¤erent product-mix and costs.
3.1 Demand Side
Following the tradition of di¤erentiated products demand models, we derive the demand function
from individual utility maximizations with discrete choices. In our model, each consumer decides
about savings and then chooses a single commercial bank for depository services or chooses the
outside option of not keeping his or her money in a commercial bank. We treat each bank as a
single product rm o¤ering deposit services. Assume that m = 1; :::;MT markets are observed, each
with i = 1; :::; Im consumers and j = 1; :::; Jm banks. We adopt the several nested logit models to
estimate the demand function. In our baseline specication we assume that consumers rst make a
decision on whether to save or not and then they choose their bank. Hence all inside products (the
individual commercial banks) combined into one group and the outside option into another. In an
other specication, we have collected national and regional banks in separate nests. Section 5.1 will
provide a more detailed description of the demand specications and the estimation results. The
outside goods are all the other nancial assets excluding bank deposits.
The logit and nested logit specications averages over the individual-specic variables rst and
then uses these averaged variables to calculate the choice probabilities of a market-level representative
agent. This is clearly a restrictive assumption, however, our more general, random coe¢ cient model
was unable to capture consumer heterogeneity and we found that the nested logit specication tted
the data better.
The conditional indirect utility function of consumer i for choosing bank js deposit services in
market m (region-year) takes the following form:
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uijm = ( pjm) + xjm + jm + ig + (1  )ijm (1)
=  pj + n ln(njm) + r ln(regionsj) + ad_agej
+jm + ig + (1  )ijm;
where  pjm is the average net deposit interest rate (the average deposit interest rate minus the
average service rate), njm is the number of bank js branches in market m, regionsj is the number of
regions that bank j has presence, d_agej is an age dummy of bank j (1 if the age is no less than 15
years)6, jm is unobserved product quality, ig consumer is utility, common to all products belonging
to group g, "ijm is the consumer-specic deviation from mean utility, and , n, r, a, and  are
demand parameters to be estimated. We also include xed e¤ects for regions and years. The "ijm is
assumed to be a mean zero stochastic term with i.i.d. extreme value Type 1 distribution.
As Berry (1994) shows, under these assumptions it is possible to aggregate the individual choices
and derive the equation to estimate the nested logit model:
ln(sjm)  ln(s0m) =  pjm + xjm + g ln(sj=gm) + jm; (2)
where s0m is the market share of the outside good and is dened by s0m = 1 
PJm
j=1 sjm, and sj=gm is
the within group market share and is dened by sj=gm = sj=
PJm
j=1 sjm. This term is also endogenous
together with the prices and instrumental variables are necessary to obtain consistent estimates.
The equation can be estimated by treating the unobserved product quality (jm) as an unobserved
error term. The bank-specic unobservable, jm, accounts for the various aspects of bank quality
that are unobserved or otherwise omitted. This may include advertising and promotion activity
of the bank, the variety of account o¤erings, and the quality of customer service training. These
unobserved characteristics could correlate with the endogenous characteristics (for example service
quality could negatively correlate with net deposit rates) and cause a simple OLS estimation to be
biased. We assume that the number of regions and the age of the banks are exogenous characteristics
while the number of branches and the net deposit interest rates are endogenous. We will control for
this endogeneity problem by using instruments.
In the long run, the number of regions where a bank is present is most likely also endogenous.
Our data and our model, however, focuses on the medium run. Opening a branch in a region where a
bank has not been present requires a much higher investment in, for example, advertising and takes
more time than increasing the number of branches in regions where the bank is already present and
known by the population. We include both the number of regions and the branches (measured in
6The age is dened as the number of years since the creation of the bank, but if a bank is older than 15 years, then
the age variable is assigned as 15 in our data. Hence, we introduce the age dummy variable.
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logarithms) to capture their declining e¤ect on demand for deposits. Finally, we add region and year
dummy variables to capture the e¤ects of changing macroeconomic conditions in a given region and
a given year.
3.2 Supply Side
On the supply side we consider di¤erent models of oligopolistic competition. Our models are versions
of the Monti-Klein model of banking with product di¤erentiation and collusion. Banks are multi-
product rms. They provide deposit services for savers (i.e. take in deposits), which they primarily
use to generate revenue through the funding of various credit instruments. We assume that banks
maximize their joint prot of all sub-markets (i.e. deposit, loan and other product markets) and
that the interbank market is perfectly competitive (i.e. banks can freely loan or borrow the excess
or necessary funds from the market at a xed interest rate7). This paper, however, focuses on the
deposit side of the banking industry and does not explicitly model any decisions on the lending side.
In the competitive model, given consumer preferences and costs of all banks, bank j chooses its
net deposit interest rates and the number of branches in each regions to maximize its prot in each
time period.
In the perfectly collusive model, given consumer preferences and costs of all banks, bank j chooses
its prices and the number of its branches to maximize the joint prots of all banks. In a collusive
equilibrium the prot-maximizing banks internalize the negative business stealing e¤ect they have
on other banks and therefore charge a higher price (lower interest rates or higher service fees in the
case of deposits).
In the partially collusive (implicit or explicit, observationally equivalent) models, depending on
the number of multi-market contacts, the colluding banks maximize the joint prot of the colluding
group.
3.2.1 Prot maximization under di¤erent conducts
Given consumer preferences and characteristics of all banks, bank j chooses its price in each market
m to maximize the following expression,
max
pjm
jm +
X
k 6=j
jkkm
= (rjm + pjm)Mmsjm +
X
k 6=j
jk(rkm + pkm)Mmskm;
7This assumption guarantees that the prot maximizing decisions are independent in the separate markets. The
assumption seemed to be innocuous before the banking crisis. As recent events showed in practice it is not necessarily
true.
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where di¤erent values of fjkgj;k stands for di¤erent competition patterns, jj = 1 for 8j, rjm is
the deposit return rate that we will estimate, it includes non-interest marginal cost and the loan or
interbank interest rates, Mm is market size of deposits in market m, and sjm is the market share of
bank j on market m;if bank j does not have any deposits on market m, then sjm is 0.
The rst-order condition with respect to pjm;
Mmsjm +
X
k 6=j
jk(rkm + pkm)Mm
@skm
@pjm
= 0: (3)
We dene @skm
@pjm
= 0 if neither bank j nor k presents on market m.
Solve for interest rate, r;
r =  p  (4p) 1  s: (4)
where Ms is a J  1 matrix, 4p is a J  J matrix with elements:
4pjk = jk
@skm
@pjm
:
Di¤erent models of competition can be included in this framework depending on the values of s.
If jj = 1 for 8j and jk = 0 for 8j 6= k, then banks are interested in maximizing only their own
prot and we are in a Nash-Bertrand competition.
If jk = 1 for 8j; k, then the banks are interested in maximizing their prot jointly, i.e. all banks
collude and we have a perfect collusion model.
If for a set of banks, Jc, jk = 1 for 8j 2 Jc, jj = 1 for 8j, all other jk are equal to 0, then
banks Jc are partially colluding and maximizing their prot jointly given the competitive fringe. We
select the set of colluding banks based on the number of their multi-market contact.
In a price-setting equilibrium, the prot-maximizing banks internalize the negative business steal-
ing e¤ect they impose on other banks and therefore charge a higher price (lower interest rates or higher
service fees in case of deposits) as the degree of cooperation increases. In the empirical application
we constrain the regional prices to be the same in that we do not observe interest rates variations at
regional level in our data.
In theory, it is possible to directly estimate the  matrix. These estimated parameters are equiv-
alent to the conjectural variation parameters used in the literature for homogenous products. Nevo
(1998) shows that in principle these parameters are identied. However, he also argues that in prac-
tice, it is hard, if not impossible, to nd such a large number of exogenous variables that inuence
demand but are uncorrelated with the shock in the pricing equation.Nevo (1998) concludes that
even for this relatively simple example there is little hope of identifying all the CV parameters in
practice.8
8Further problems with the conjectural variation method are discussed by Corts (1999).
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Similarly to Bresnahan (1987), we estimate several sets of demand and supply parameters under
di¤erent modes of conduct corresponding to di¤erent values for the elements of the  matrix, in
accordance to the interpretation suggested by economic theory. Then we test between the di¤erent
models of conduct by comparing the t of the various models using the non-nested test of Rivers and
Vuong (2002).
We instrument the number of branches in the demand estimation without explicitly modelling
how these numbers are determined. The exercise of modelling branching decision is left for future
research.
3.2.2 Deposit return rate
The deposit return rate summarizes the non-interest marginal cost and the loan or interbank interest
rates that a specic bank can earn on the deposit amounts. Researchers have traditionally included
product characteristics as determinants of marginal costs or estimated a translog cost function on
accounting data. We follow the rst approach and specify the deposit return rate of bank j as a
function of the observed exogenous characteristics (number of regions where the banks operate, the
age of the bank and whether it is a national bank (operating in more than 16 regions)):
rjm = 0 + r ln(regionsj) + ad_agej + nd_nationalj + !jm; (5)
where
!jm is unobserved supply factors, and
0, r, a, and m are parameters to be estimated. We include year dummies and region dummies.
The deposit return rate is strongly related to the loan interest rate. However, the loan interest
rate is an endogenous variable. The deposit return rate is assumed to be the outcome of the optimal
loan rate for a given bank. Hence, we do not include the endogenous loan interest rate as a regressor
in the specication above.
3.3 Elasticities
3.3.1 Local market elasticities
The implied own- and cross-price elasticities for the average deposit interest rates minus service fees
in a local market m are:
"jjm =
@sjm
@pjm
pjm
sjm
=   1
1  pjm
 
1  sj=gm   (1  ) sjm

; (6)
"jkm =
@sjm
@pkm
pkm
sjm
=
1
1  pk
 
sk=gm + (1  ) skm

if j 6= k and k 2 g; (7)
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where  is the within group correlation of utility levels. These elasticities refer to the percentage
change in market share in response to a change in net interest rates. The cross-price elasticity between
product j and product k located in a di¤erent group g is independent of j.
Note that  pjm is the average deposit interest rate minus the service rate. Usually, the average
deposit interest rate is greater than service fee (about 90%) or the price, pjm, is negative. The own
price elasticity is usually positive rather than negative.
3.3.2 Whole market elasticities
In Italy, at least in our data, the average deposit interest rates and service fees do not vary regionally.
This fact could in itself indicate a less than competitive behavior although other cost-related factors
could also provide an explanation. Any change in deposit interest rates and service fees, as they are
nationally set, should have impact on every local market. We should also compute the whole market
elasticities as well when examining the price elasticities.
The whole own- and cross-price elasticities for the average deposit interest rates minus service
fees are:
"jj =
@TDepj
@pj
pj
TDepj
(8)
= (
X
m
Mm
@sjm
@pj
)
pjP
mMmsjm
= [
X
m
Mmsjm
1
1  
 
1  sj=gm   (1  ) sjm

]
pjP
mMmsjm
;
"jk =
@TDepj
@pk
pk
TDepj
(9)
= (
X
m
Mm
@sjm
@pk
)
pkP
mMmsjm
=  [
X
m
Mmsjm
1
1  
 
sk=gm + (1  ) skm

]
pkP
mMmsjm
;
where TDepj =
P
mMmsjm stand for the total deposits of bank j across the whole country. These
elasticities refer to the percentage change in market share in response to a change in price. The
cross-price elasticity between product j and product k located in a di¤erent group g is independent
of j. Note that the whole cross-price elasticity can be equal to 0 if banks j and k do not have any
overlapped markets.
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4 Estimation
For the demand side, we adopt a nested logit model. The simple logit model has the so-called
independence of irrelevant alternatives property when only aggregate data are available and the
estimated substitution patterns are very restrictive. The model implies that if two products have
the same market share then they have the same cross-price elasticities and the same markups. The
nested logit slightly improves this problem as these issues arises only within nests. Nonetheless, the
logit and nested logit estimations are computationally less burdensome than that of the mixed logit
model (BLP), and may also provide substantial intuition regarding the validity of the identication
strategy. We also estimated a mixed logit model but we found that the random coe¢ cient parameters
were not signicant and our nested logit specication performed better.
The net price and the number of branches of a bank in a region are endogenous variables and
this fact calls for instrumental variables. We adopt Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as
estimation method similarly to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (BLP) (1995). Our moment conditions
state that the cost and demand shocks, ! and  are independent of our instruments, i.e. they form
the following moment conditions:
E[jzd] = 0;
E[!jzs] = 0:
Following BLP (1995), the set of instruments include exogenous characteristics of competitors
and exogenous marginal cost shifters. We have computed the sum of competitorscharacteristics and
then averaged this sum across each banks markets and use these as instrument.
For the supply side, we estimate the model under the 21 assumptions: (i) Nash-Bertrand, (ii-xx)
partial collusion of the banks with market coverage n(= 20; :::; 2), (xxi) perfect collusion. They are
ordered by the decreasing degree of competition.
We estimate the demand and the supply models both separately, to avoid the contamination due
to the misspecication of either the demand or the supply models, and jointly as well, to increase
the e¢ ciency of our estimates. In the joint estimation we allow for an arbitrary dependence between
the cost shock ! and the demand shock . We also allow for arbitrary correlations of ! and  among
products within the same market.
4.1 Instruments
In our base specication, demand is a¤ected by net interest rate, the logarithm of the number of
branches, the logarithm of the number of regions where the bank is present, the age dummy of the
banks (as proxy for reputation and relationship), the logarithm of the within group share and market
and year dummies. The net interest rate, the within group share, and the number of branches are
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endogenous, so we used the instrumental variable technique.
Our instrumental variables include three parts. The rst part consists of the exogenous bank
characteristics (bank-year level), including the logarithm of the number of regions, the age dummy
variable of a bank. The second part is constructed from the given bank characteristics, or BLP IVs
(bank-region-year level), including the logarithm of the sum of the number of regions where all the
other regional rival banks operate, the logarithm of the average of the number of regions where all the
other banks have at least one branch, and the average age of all other rival banks (in logarithm). The
third part is related to cost characteristics, including the ratio of total cost (including personnel cost)
to total assets, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and the ratio of bad loans to total assets. The
bad loans is at bank-region-year level, and total cost and liquid assets are both at bank-year level.
These cost variables control for operating expenses, and a¤ect the deposit interest rate. They are
not supposed to be correlated with the demand shocks. Small depositors are covered by the deposit
insurance and when they selects a bank, the depositors usually value the benets from banks services
and interest rates rather than the strength of the its nancial statement (where the cost variables
reported).
Since the Rivers and Vuong (2002) test requires overidentication, we use two extra IVs on the
supply side: the total number of regions where all the other regional rival banks operating, and its
squared value (both measured in logarithm).
5 Empirical Results
Firstly, we present the separate and joint demand and supply parameter estimates under di¤erent
supply models. Secondly, we test which supply model ts the data best. Finally we present some
welfare estimates from a counter-factual simulations.
5.1 Demand and supply estimations
As discussed previously, for the demand side, we use a nested logit model.9 We have estimated our
demand model both separately and jointly with the supply models.
Table 2 present the rst stage regressions of our base specication for the within nest share, the
net deposit rate and for the number of branches, respectively. We use region and year dummies to
help to control for the unobserved demand shifters. In the reported regressions, standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. The instrumental variables mostly have signicant explanatory power
and the estimation satises the usual instrument test for relevance and validity. The Shea partial
R2 measure and the rst stage F and Anderson statistics indicate that the hypothesis that our
9We also estimated a random coe¢ cient logit model (see BLP (1995) and Nevo (2001)). Unfortunately none of our
random coe¢ cient are signicant.
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instruments are relevant cannot be rejected. The Hansen J-test indicates that the null hypothesis of
correct model specication and valid overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected.10
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of the demand function and the results of the speci-
cation tests with the separately estimated demand. We use three nested logit model to estimate
the demand. Models (i), (ii) put all banks into one nest. Model (iii) classies banks into two nests:
national banks and local banks, where the national banks are dened as banks with market coverage
of at least 16 regions. The distribution of banksmarket coverage is shown in Figure 1. Model (iv)
is a two level nested logit model. First, we put all banks into one nest; Second, we further classify
banks into two nests: national banks and local banks.11 In Model (iv), the group segmentation
parameter (g) is negative and insignicant at at 5%: A t test shows that the subgroup segmentation
parameter (kg) is insignicantly di¤erent from the group segmentation parameter (g) at 5% level
(with t statistic equal to 1:547). This means that the two-level nested logit model can be reduced
to either Model (ii) or Model (iii). In Tables 4, we summarize the elasticities of Models (ii) and
(iii). The price elasticities for Models (ii) and (iii) are close. For example, the mean of local market
own-price elasticities are 0:9276, 0:9524 for Models (ii), (iii) respectively.
We use model (ii) as our demand estimates in the following analysis for three main reasons.
First, the R2 of Model (ii) is greater than Model (iii). Second, the classication of national and
regional banks is based on banks coverage, which we have already included as an exogenous bank
characteristic in the demand estimation. That is to say, Model (ii) has already taken whether a bank
is national or regional into consideration. Third, a classic criticism to the nested logit model is that
we might make some arbitrary standard to classify products into di¤erent nests. According to Figure
1, there is no clear break in the distribution of bankscoverage.
Most of the parameters are estimated with precision and they have the expected sign. Consumer
utility (and the market share of the bank) is increasing in the net deposit interest rate and the number
of branches. The parameter of the within group share indicates that our nested logit specication
ts the data well and indeed the products in the nest are closer substitutes to each other than to the
outside good. The number of regions where the bank is operating and the age dummy variable of
the bank do not have signicant e¤ects on market shares.
For the supply side, the deposit return rate depends on the logarithm of the number of regions
where the bank is operating, the age dummy, the national bank dummy, year dummy, and region
dummies.
10These tests are part of the standard output of ivreg2 command in Stata and their detailed description can be
found for example in Baum (2006.)
11The estimation regression equation for the two-level nested logit model is
ln(sjm)  ln(s0m) =  pj + xjm + kg ln(sj=gm) + g ln(sg=Gm) + jm;
where sj=gm is the within group market share of bank j in its subgroup (national or local banks) in market m, and
sg=Gm is the ratio the market share of national banks (if bank j is a national bank) or local banks (if bank j is a
local bank) to the market share of all banks in market m.
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For the supply side, we estimate the model under the following 21 assumptions: (i) Nash-Bertrand,
Bert randjk =
8<: 1; if j = k;0; otherwise.
(ii-xx) collusion of the banks with market coverage n(= 20; :::; 2) or CI n,
CI njk =
8>>><>>>:
1; if j = k;
1; if market coverage of j  n, and market coverage of k  n;
0; otherwise.
(xxi) perfect collusion
Collusionjk = 1 for all j; k.
Columns in Table 5 report the marginal cost parameters under six di¤erent supply side modeling
assumptions.
The marginal cost parameters include a constant, the exogenous bank characteristics, year dum-
mies, and region dummies. Our results indicate that older banks have signicantly lower deposit
returns. This fact could be due to either higher non-interest costs, lower loan interest rates or pos-
sibly stronger market power than younger banks due to long term relationships that they had more
time to build. A national bank tend to have higher deposit returns, which is probably due to the fact
that a national bank caters to di¤erent loan markets (i.e. credit cards vs mortgages) than regional
banks. The sign of the number of regions where the bank is present changes with the supply model.
It switches from signicantly negative to insignicant as we consider more and more competitive
supply models.
We have estimated demand and supply jointly as well. Both the estimated demand and supply
parameters seem to be robust and do not change signicantly under di¤erent supply models relative
to the separately estimated parameters.12
5.2 Testing bank conducts
We use the Rivers and Vuong (2002) test for selection among the rm conducts. Table 6-A reports the
non-nested test results from the estimates when demand and supply are estimated separately. The
competition patterns are ordered from the most competitive one (Bertrand) to the least competitive
one (collusion). In Table 6-A, the test statistics of  3:2843 shows that we can reject perfect collusion
against the Nash-Bertrand competition at 1% signicant level. The only model that cannot be
rejected by any other and all others can be rejected against at 5% signicant level is the one where
12We omit the results for saving space, however, these are available upon request.
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banks with at least 19 regions form a coalition. In 2007, there are 8 banks with at least 19 market
coverage.
For the robustness checks, we also consider a few other measures of multi-market contacts.
First, we checked a pairwise measure. Banks i and j cooperate (i.e ij = ji = 1) if the number
of their overlapped markets is greater than n (n 2 [1; 20]). If bank k overlaps with bank i on more
than n market but does not overlap with bank j the corresponding lambdas would be ik = ki = 1
but kj = jk = 0: The corresponding values of s for collusion of the banks with the number of
overlapped market  n(= 1; :::; 20) or CII n, are
CII njk =
8>>><>>>:
1; if j = k;
1; if the number of overlapped markets of j and k  n;
0; otherwise.
The second measure takes into account that the markets are asymmetric. It does matter that
the retaliation for deviation happens in a small or in a large market. Therefore, we introduce the
second categories of coalitions by using deposit-weighted contact measure. The deposit-weighted
contact measure is a sum of weight times the indicator of overlapped market, where the weight is the
share of deposits for each region in a given year. If banks i and j are both operating on market 1,
then the indicator of overlapped market for banks i and j on market 1 is 1, otherwise it is 0. So the
deposit-weighted contact measure, like the absolute contact measure, lies between 0 and 1. Compared
with the absolute contact measure, the deposit-weighted contact measure puts more weight on large
markets:
CWI njk =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1; if j = k;
1; if
P20
l=1
Deposits of region l
Deposits of the whole country  1(bank i is on market l)  n20 ,
and
P20
l=1
Deposits of region l
Deposits of the whole country  1(bank j is on market l)  n20 ;
0; otherwise.
We have also created a mixture of the two; pairwise measure that takes into account the asym-
metry of the markets:
CWII njk =
8>>><>>>:
1; if j = k;
1; if
P20
l=1
Deposits of region l
Deposits of the whole country  1(banks i and j are on market l)  n20 ;
0; otherwise.
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According to the non-nested test, the best models in the rst category, or the models that can-
not be rejected by other models at 1% signicant level, are those coalitions formed by banks with
overlapped markets above or equal to 18 or 19; and with 9 or 8 banks involved respectively. The
best model in the second category is the coalition formed by banks with the deposit-weighted contact
measure equal to 1 and with 6 banks involved. This model is the same as the coalition formed by
banks covering at least 20 regions, and is rejected by the coalition formed banks with market coverage
of at least 19 regions as in Table 6-A. The best model in the fourth category is the coalition formed by
banks with the deposit-weighted coverage measure equal to 1, which is also the same as the coalition
formed by banks covering at least 20 regions. In Table 6-B, except the coalition formed by banks
covering at least 19 regions and the coalition formed by banks with at least 19 overlapped markets
are rejected by the best baseline model (coalition formed by banks with overlapped markets above or
equal to 19) at 5% signicant level, and all the other models are rejected by the best baseline model
at 1% signicant level.
Table 7 describes the within group markets shares of banks with at least 19 regionscoverage,
the total deposits, HHI (Herndahl-Hirschman Index) in each market, and the HHI if we treat these
banks as one bank. Although there are only 8 banks in the coordination group, their market shares
are not small at all. The region level market share of these banks range from 19:7% to 78:3%. The
country level inside market shareof these banks is up to 44:9%. Valle dAosta is the region with
the greatest share of coalition banks but also with the second highest HHI. However, a large share
of the coalition is not related to a large HHI. This highlights the fact that often used HHI index
in the bank competition versus stabilityliterature may not be a very useful proxy of competitive
conduct.
To better describe the characteristics of those banks that form a coalition, we present the summary
of own and cross price elasticities estimates in Tables 8 and 9 respectively. In Table 8, the average of
local or whole market own-price elasticities of coordinating group are lower than their counterparts
of non-colluding group. This means that banks in the coordinating group have greater market
power than banks in the non-colluding groups. This is consistent with the observed price level: the
average deposit interest rate minus service rate for coordinating group (1:32%) is lower than that
for non-colluding group (1:68%) in 2007. In Table 9, the absolute value of the average of local or
whole market cross-price elasticities of coordinating group are higher than their counterparts of non-
colluding groups and the cross-price elasticities between coordinating and non-colluding groups. This
indicates that bank services of non-colluding groups, and bank services between two groups are less
substitutable. This is probably because small local banks tend to customize their service more to
local markets than large banks. Small banks tend to have their own specic features in tailoring their
services to customers, while large banks tend to standardize their service.
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5.3 Counter-factual analysis: Consumer welfare
To examine how competition a¤ects consumer welfare we calculate counter-factual measures to com-
pare welfare under the partially collusive and the perfectly competitive scenarios. In each exercise,
we solve for a new vector of optimal prices and quantities that satisfy the rst order conditions
implied by the particular supply model both under the separately and the jointly estimated demand
and supply equations. For comparison we also compute the change in consumer welfare through our
estimation period of 2003-2007.
The change in welfare per euro:
1

fln[
X
j
exp(postj )]  ln[
X
j
exp(prej )]g:
The total change in consumer welfare with xed market size:
1

fMpre ln[
X
j
exp(postj )] Mpre ln[
X
j
exp(prej )]g:
The total change in consumer welfare:
1

fMpost ln[
X
j
exp(postj )] Mpre ln[
X
j
exp(prej )]g:
The total social welfare (the total change in consumer welfare plus the total change in banks
prot):
1

fMpost ln[
X
j
exp(postj )] Mpre ln[
X
j
exp(prej )]g+
X
j
(postj   prej );
where  Pj(postj   prej ) are banksexcess prots.
Table 10 shows how much change in consumer welfare change per euro and total consumer welfare
change from 2003 to 2007 for each region, and total consumer welfare change from 2003 to 2007 for
the whole country. The consumer welfare change per euro is positive for 8 regions, while the total
consumer welfare change is positive for 16 regions. With xed market size, the average regional
change in total consumer welfare from 2003 to 2007 is 26:9 million of Euros per region, compared to
526 million of Euros when the change in market size is considered. This shows that the increase in
total consumer welfare is mainly due to the increase in total market size rather than from the change
in bank service, such as interest rate, service rate, and bank coverage. The consumer welfare of the
whole country has increased by about 10:5 billion euro from 2003 to 2007 or by 2:63 billion per year.
Table 11 summarizes the counter-factual results for the case where there would be no coalitions in
2007 (competition scenario). If the banking sector were competitive on the deposit services market
in 2007, then the average deposit rate minus service rate would increase from 1:65% to 1:78%, and
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the consumer welfare would have been higher by about 1; 769 million euro. It is equivalent of a 13
basis point di¤erence between the net deposit rates under the two scenarios. This would not be an
insignicant amount, when its gauged to the current low level of interest rates; of course, the interest
rate remuneration reects only in part the full value of deposit services for bankscustomers. We
also found that the deadweight loss due to the less than competitive banksbehavior amounts to a
tangible 1:039 billion euro in 2007.
It would be tempting to draw policy conclusion from our research. However, we recognize that
our model does not able to fully describe the complexity of the banking industry. Our paper provides
a better approach to measure the competitiveness of the banking sector but we are not able to draw
any conclusion on the relationship between competition and systemic stability. The model should be
extended to include the loan side of the banking business. We leave these interesting questions for
future research.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the competitive behavior at the Italian retail banking industry, using a structural
model of demand and supply side of the deposit market. We nd that deposit service demand is
moderately price sensitive in Italy. Consumers displayed a stronger preference for higher net deposit
interest rates and a well-developed branch systems. In most of our supply specications we have
found that banks that are present at a larger number of regions have better opportunity to lend out
their deposit funds at higher interest rates, whereas older banks typically can lend only at lower level
or have higher non-interest costs. Our non-nested test could reject the fully collusive model against
the competitive model at a 1% signicance level. However, we could reject the competitive model
and also the fully collusive model against partial collusion of the banks with market contact in at
least in 19 regions. Furthermore all other models were rejected by this latter partial collusion model.
We found that the loss of depositorswelfare due to the lack of competition was about 1.80 billion
euro in 2007.
We conclude with some caveats. First, we have used only the deposit data and banking is
naturally a multi-product and multi-sided business. Secondly, our model does not take into account
the potential trade-o¤ between competition and stability in the banking system. Finally, our model
is static and does not include dynamic considerations, like the choice of the number of branches, or
improvements in technological e¢ ciency. To enable us to explore policy implications the model should
be extended further to included risks and dynamic elements. We leave these interesting questions for
future research.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Results
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max Obs.
Panel A: Bank characteristics (bank-year level)
Deposit interest rate 0.0140 0.00725 0.00423 0.0088 0.0114 0.0172 0.0610 517
Service rate 0.00649 0.00725 1.5610 5 0.0038 0.00557 0.0070 0.0955 517
Deposit interest rate - service rate 0.00750 0.00976 -0.0728 0.0022 0.00603 0.0119 0.0414 517
Number of regions 6.068 5.624 1 2 4 8 20 517
Age 14.23 2.369 1 15 15 15 15 517
Dummy = 1 if age  15 0.880 0.325 0 1 1 1 1 517
Total cost / total assets 0.0207 0.00718 0.00119 0.0171 0.0210 0.0245 0.0549 517
Liquid assets / total assets 0.0748 0.0896 4.9410 5 0.0192 0.0417 0.0925 0.628 517
Panel B: Bank-market characteristics (bank-region-year level)
Market share 0.0118 0.0259 6.51e-08 0.000583 0.00259 0.0107 0.319 3118
Within group share 0.0321 0.0592 2.6010 7 0.00185 0.0080 0.0333 0.502 3118
Number of branches 40.89 80.21 1 3 10 44 1225 3118
Number of competitors with 31.81 14.61 8 19 31 49 59 3118
age  15 in the same region
Bad loans / total assets 0.000701 0.00187 0 1.8910 5 0.000106 0.000487 0.0238 3118
Bad loans / liquid assets 0.0335 0.122 0 0.000255 0.00195 0.0127 1.561 3118
Panel C: Market characteristics (region-year level)
Number of banks 31.18 14.46 12 20 28.50 39.50 65 100
Total bank deposits (billion Euros) 27 29.6 1.04 7.44 14.5 38.9 140.0 100
Note: If a banks age is greater than 15, then the age variable is assigned to 15 in the data.
Therefore, we introduce an age dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if age  15.
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TABLE 2: Demand Estimation: First Stage Regressions
Dependent variables: Dependent variables: Dependent variables:
Deposit interest rate
ln(within group share) - service rate ln(number of branches)
Explanatory Variables
Exogenous bank characteristics (bank-region-year level)
ln(number of regions) 0.448** -0.000786 0.441***
(2.37) (-1.03) (3.03)
Dummy = 1 if age  15 0.671 -0.00233 0.599
(0.72) (-0.92) (1.11)
Cost characteristics (bank-year level)
Total cost / total assets 6.270 -0.110 8.221
(0.16) (-0.77) (0.40)
Liquid assets / total assets 2.080 0.0171** 0.0651
(0.78) (2.21) (0.04)
Cost characteristics (bank-region-year level)
Bad loans / total assets 408.7*** -0.215 354.2***
(5.03) (-1.41) (4.81)
BLP IVs (bank-region-year level)
ln(sum of the number of regions -5.422*** 0.0119* -2.187**
of competitors in the same region) (-3.41) (1.98) (-2.02)
Year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Region xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.210 0.407 0.242
F 6.25 25.33 7.07
Markets 20 20 20
Years 5 5 5
Observations 3118 3118 3118
Note: We cluster the standard errors at the bank level.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Asterisks indicate signicance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) or better.
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TABLE 3: Demand Estimation using the Nested Logit models and IV Test Results
Dependent variable: ln(sjm)  ln(s0m), where sjm is the market share of bank j
in market m, and s0m is the market share of outside goods in market m.
First level nest National &
All banks All banks local banks All banks
Second level nest - - - National &
local banks
IVs No Yes Yes Yes
Explanatory Variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Group segmentation parameter 0.997*** 0.680*** 0.708*** -0.535
(g) (234.59) (6.31) (11.36) (-0.74)
Subgroup segmentation parameter - - - 0.600***
(kg) - - - (4.03)
Deposit interest rate - service rate 0.422 41.19** 39.22*** 43.52***
(0.93) (2.49) (3.51) (3.05)
ln(number of branches) 0.00169 0.383*** 0.343*** 0.474***
(0.34) (3.21) (5.20) (2.73)
ln(number of regions) -0.000137 0.0319 -0.0544*** -0.0971
(-0.05) (1.10) (-2.66) (-1.43)
Dummy = 1 if age  15 -0.00973 0.0814 0.181* 0.186
(-1.49) (0.49) (1.66) (1.22)
Year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.978 0.944 0.943 0.937
F - 966.4 911.7 880.2
Underidentication test - 29.74 81.41 10.02
(p value) - (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0184)
Hansen J statistic - 0.098 6.270 3.534
(p value) - (0.7544) (0.0992) (0.1709)
Markets 20 20 20 20
Years 5 5 5 5
Observations 3118 3118 3118 3118
Note: National banks are dened as banks with market coverage  16:
Market size is dened as total nancial assets.
We cluster the standard erros at the bank level.
Demand and supply are estimated separately.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks indicate signicance at 10% (*), 5% (**)
and 1% (***) or better.
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TABLE 4: Summary of Elasticities Estimates
Model Numbers in Table 3 (ii) (iii)
Local market own-price elasticities
Mean 0.9276 0.9524
25% quantile 0.2078 0.2060
Median 0.6992 0.7078
75% quantile 1.4587 1.5004
Local market cross-price elasticities
Mean -0.0168 -0.0330
25% quantile -0.0123 -0.0273
Median -0.0024 -0.0050
75% quantile -0.0003 -0.0006
Whole market own-price elasticities
Mean 0.9138 0.9214
25% quantile 0.2751 0.2818
Median 0.7150 0.7068
75% quantile 1.4716 1.5025
Whole market cross-price elasticities
Mean -0.0058 -0.0113
25% quantile -0.0026 -0.0051
Median -0.0001 -0.0003
75% quantile 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
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In the following Tables, the results are based on the demand estimates of Model (ii) in Table 3.
TABLE 5: Supply Estimation
Dependent variable: the recovered deposit return rate
Explanatory Variables Bertrand CI 18 CI 19 CII 18 CII 19 Collusion
ln(number of regions) -0.0006* -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005
(-1.8141) (-1.3137) (-1.3019) (-1.3129) (-1.3024) (-0.6601)
Dummy = 1 if age  15 -0.0032*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0036**
(-4.7132) (-4.6083) (-4.7173) (-4.6199) (-4.7293) (-2.1037)
Dummy =1 if it is a national bank -0.0003 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0019*** 0.0018*** -0.0003
(-0.5294) (4.0698) (3.8635) (4.0485) (3.8418) (-0.2117)
R2 0.3792 0.4106 0.4064 0.4102 0.4058 0.5139
Deposit return rate 0.0154 0.0162 0.0162 0.0162 0.0162 0.0530
Deposit interest rate - service rate 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074
Markup 0.0080 0.0089 0.0088 0.0089 0.0088 0.0456
Deposit weighted deposit return rate 0.0151 0.0167 0.0167 0.0167 0.0167 0.0557
Deposit weighted 0.0064 0.0064 0.0064 0.0064 0.0064 0.0064
(deposit interest rate - service rate)
Deposit weighted markup 0.0086 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.0492
Market xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Markets 20 20 20 20 20 20
Years 5 5 5 5 5 5
Observations 3118 3118 3118 3118 3118 3118
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Asterisks indicate signicance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) or better.
Markup is dened as Deposit return rate minus (Deposit interest rate - service rate).
National banks are dened as banks with market coverage  16:
We do not list all demand estimates here for space issue.
CI n stands for coalitions that are formed by banks with market coverage at least n.
For example, CI 18 stands for coalitions formed by banks with market coverage at least 18:
CII n stands for coalitions of two banks with at least n overlapped market.
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TABLE 6-A:Results of the Rivers and Vuong Test
Test Statistic Tn =
p
ncn

Q1n(
b1) Q2n(b2)  ! N(0; 1)
H2nH1 Bertrand CI 15 CI 16 CI 17 CI 18 CI 19 CI 20 Collusion
Bertrand - 2.2666 4.3474 -5.9975 -5.9991 -5.9893 -6.3072 3.2843
CI 15 -2.2666 - 3.4507 -5.3036 -5.4733 -5.4788 -5.4992 3.2232
CI 16 -4.3474 -3.4507 - -6.1851 -6.0912 -6.0858 -6.2079 3.1644
CI 17 5.9975 5.3036 6.1851 - -4.0453 -4.0871 -3.1156 3.4532
CI 18 5.9991 5.4733 6.0912 4.0453 - -1.9803 3.2392 3.5145
CI 19 5.9893 5.4788 6.0858 4.0871 1.9803 - 3.5481 3.5182
CI 20 6.3072 5.4992 6.2079 3.1156 -3.2392 -3.5481 - 3.4895
Collusion -3.2843 -3.2232 -3.1644 -3.4532 -3.5145 -3.5182 -3.4895 -
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
Recall that for a (1%) 5% size of the test, H2 is rejected in favor of H1
if Tn is lower than the critical value -2.58 (-1.96) and that H1 is rejected in
favor of H2 if Tn is higher than the critical value 2.58 (1.96).
CI n stands for coalitions that are formed by banks with at least n regions
coverage.
TABLE 6-B: Results of the Rivers and Vuong Test
Test Statistic Tn =
p
ncn

Q1n(
b1) Q2n(b2)  ! N(0; 1)
H2nH1 Bertrand CI 18 CI 19 CII 18 CII 19 Collusion
Bertrand 0.0000 -5.9991 -5.9893 -5.9997 -5.9939 3.2843
CI 18 5.9991 0.0000 -1.9803 -1.5944 -1.9880 3.5145
CI 19 5.9893 1.9803 0.0000 1.9699 -0.1005 3.5182
CII 18 5.9997 1.5944 -1.9699 0.0000 -1.9792 3.5148
CII 19 5.9939 1.9879 0.1005 1.9792 0.0000 3.5181
Collusion -3.2843 -3.5145 -3.5182 -3.5148 -3.5181 0.0000
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
Recall that for a (1%) 5% size of the test, H2 is rejected in favor of
H1 if Tn is lower than the critical value -2.58 (-1.96) and that H1 is
rejected in favor of H2 if Tn is higher than the critical value 2.58 (1.96).
CI n stands for coalitions that are formed by banks with at least n
regionscoverage.
CII n stands for coalitions of two banks with at least n overlapped market.
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TABLE 7: Banks with At Least 19 RegionsCoverage in 2007
Inside Total deposits
Regions market share (Million of Euros) HHI HHI2
Piemonte 0.610 24,824 0.151 0.386
Val dAosta 0.783 910.7 0.253 0.631
Lombardy 0.422 53,879 0.103 0.198
Trentino 0.286 1,514 0.177 0.232
Veneto 0.494 18,828 0.104 0.288
Friuli Venezia 0.487 4,537 0.138 0.311
Liguria 0.425 6,140 0.144 0.268
Emilia Romagna 0.305 14,625 0.064 0.136
Tuscany 0.352 11,646 0.107 0.190
Umbria 0.605 3,138 0.136 0.401
Marche 0.223 2,450 0.248 0.288
Lazio 0.691 45,011 0.094 0.481
Abruzzo 0.197 1,846 0.098 0.128
Molise 0.491 726.9 0.110 0.287
Campania 0.417 13,870 0.115 0.260
Puglia 0.498 10,432 0.080 0.289
Basilicata 0.317 568.0 0.147 0.230
Calabria 0.572 3,588 0.148 0.421
Sicily 0.394 9,775 0.174 0.301
Sardinia 0.412 4,518 0.280 0.395
Country (mean) 0.449 11,641 0.144 0.306
Country (sum) - 232,828 - -
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
HHI2 (Herndahl index) is computed by treating the coordination group
as one bank.
Numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Asterisks indicate signicance at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) or better.
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TABLE 8: Summary of Own Price Elasticities Estimates
Local market own-price elasticities of coordination group
Mean 0.5578
25% quantile 0.0103
Median 0.2259
75% quantile 0.9986
Local market own-price elasticities of non-coordination group
Mean 1.0375
25% quantile 0.3063
Median 0.7753
75% quantile 1.5523
Whole market own-price elasticities of coordination group
Mean 0.5330
25% quantile -0.0002
Median 0.2093
75% quantile 0.9617
Whole market own-price elasticities of non-coordination group
Mean 0.9423
25% quantile 0.3130
Median 0.7382
75% quantile 1.5084
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
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TABLE 9: Summary of Cross Price Elasticities Estimates
Local market cross-price elasticities within coordination group
Mean -0.0288
25% quantile -0.0321
Median -0.0072
75% quantile -0.0002
Local market cross-price elasticities within non-coordination group
Mean -0.0135
25% quantile -0.0092
Median -0.0019
75% quantile -0.0003
Local market cross-price elasticities between coordination group
and noncoordination group
Mean -0.0227
25% quantile -0.0210
Median -0.0039
75% quantile -0.0003
Whole market cross-price elasticities within coordination group
Mean -0.0287
25% quantile -0.0417
Median -0.0190
75% quantile -0.0005
Whole market cross-price elasticities within non-coordination group
Mean -0.0043
25% quantile -0.0017
Median -0.0001
75% quantile 0.0000
Whole market cross-price elasticities between coordination group
and noncoordination group
Mean -0.0146
25% quantile -0.0136
Median -0.0025
75% quantile -0.0003
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
30
TABLE 10: Change in Consumer Welfare 2003-2007
Total consumer
welfare change if
Consumer welfare Total market Total market there is no change Total consumer
change size in 2003 size in 2007 in market size welfare change
Regions per Euro (Billion of Euros) (Billion of Euros) (Million of Euros) (Million of Euros)
Piemonte -0.0029 101.6 122 -299.2 548.9
Val dAosta -0.0223 2.271 6.61 -50.55 20.33
Lombardy -0.0073 353.4 510.5 -2586 3655
Trentino -0.0127 14.44 29.17 -183.2 120.0
Veneto 0.0017 137.0 127.2 230.75 -146.7
Friuli Venezia -0.0042 44.65 55.03 -188.1 22.80
Liguria 0.0096 45.74 36.56 441.1 25.57
Emilia Romagna -0.0080 135.6 207.8 -1083 1588
Tuscany 0.0069 106.5 88.21 731.0 -92.03
Umbria 0.0029 20.80 20.28 60.72 44.98
Marche -0.0033 39.54 54.14 -132.5 251.8
Lazio -0.0233 101.7 234.4 -2370 3160
Abruzzo 0.0152 27.40 18.92 416.0 -29.58
Molise -0.0153 5.658 14.03 -86.84 29.87
Campania 0.0675 73.72 35.66 4980 647.3
Puglia -0.0097 51.15 76.73 -495.4 342.53
Basilicata 0.0084 18.96 9.77 159.1 -19.53
Calabria -0.0062 8.950 10.09 -55.67 6.436
Sicily 0.0297 36.22 28.12 1077 313.0
Sardinia -0.0014 20.02 21.40 -27.99 33.86
Country (mean) 0.0013 67.27 85.33 26.89 526.1
Country (sum) - 1,345 1,707 537.8 10,523
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separately.
Total marekt sizes in 2003 have been adjusted to Billion of Euros in 2007 by ination rate.
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TABLE 11: Loss of Consumer Welfare Due To Coalitions Formed by Coalition Relative to Bertrand Competition in 2007
Consumer welfare Total market Total consumer Total bank Total
loss per Euro size in 2007 welfare loss prot change welfare loss
Regions (Billion of Euros) (Million of Euros) (Million of Euros) (Million of Euros)
Piemonte 0.0018 122 216.7 -89.40 127.3
Val dAosta 0.0032 6.61 20.99 -4.372 16.62
Lombardy 0.0005 510.5 277.6 -78.66 199.0
Trentino 0.0004 29.17 11.23 -1.745 9.488
Veneto 0.0011 127.2 144.8 -53.22 91.57
Friuli Venezia 0.0010 55.03 55.18 -10.59 44.59
Liguria 0.0010 36.56 37.96 -14.87 23.10
Emilia Romagna 0.0003 207.8 70.84 -19.02 51.82
Tuscany 0.0007 88.21 57.73 -19.75 37.98
Umbria 0.0019 20.28 38.39 -11.45 26.94
Marche 0.0003 54.14 15.02 -2.842 12.17
Lazio 0.0021 234.4 501.0 -239.5 261.5
Abruzzo 0.0003 18.92 6.371 -2.023 4.348
Molise 0.0007 14.03 10.34 -1.548 8.794
Campania 0.0019 35.66 67.97 -67.97 0.0037
Puglia 0.0014 76.73 105.1 -31.20 73.90
Basilicata 0.0006 9.77 5.730 -0.8802 4.850
Calabria 0.0042 10.09 42.39 -22.25 20.14
Sicily 0.0019 28.12 53.59 -43.83 9.761
Sardinia 0.0014 21.40 30.03 -14.50 15.53
Country (mean) 0.0013 85.33 88.45 -36.48 51.97
Country (sum) - 1,707 1,769 -729.6 1,039
Note: Demand and supply are estimated separtely.
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8 Appendix B
8.1 Non-nested tests
Here is the procedure for a general non-nested test when a GMM estimation is used. Suppose that
for each pairwise comparison there are two models M1 and M2. ForM1, the moment conditions that
we use are
E[m1(1)] = 0:
For M2, the moment conditions that we use are
E[m2(2)] = 0:
z is a vector of instruments. There are two requirements for the non-nested test: (1) the GMM
estimation has to be overidentied to use the nonnested test; (2) the two comparing models have to
share the same instrument variables, z.
Then we use the Rivers and Vuong (2002) test for selection among the rm conducts. The value of
the test statistic, T =
p
nb (cQ1 cQ2), is to be compared with critical values of a N(0; 1). cQ1 and cQ2 are
the values of the rst-stepobjective functions which employ the same consistent estimator of the
weighting matrix W , based on the same set of instruments for the series of models to be compared.
W is dened as W = 1
n
z0z, where z is a vector of instruments. cQi is dened as cQi = bG0iW bGi, wherebGi = 1nPmi(bi). b is an estimate of the sampling variance of the di¤erence between objectives and
is taken as
2 = 4[G
0
1WE11WG1 +G
0
2WE22WG2   2G
0
1WE12WG2]
and is estimated using bGi = 1nPmi(bi) and bEij = 1nPmi(bi)mj(bj)0.
The null hypothesis (H0) is that M1 and M2 are asymptotically equivalent; the rst alternative
hypothesis (H1) is that M1 is asymptotically better than M2; the second alternative hypothesis (H2)
is that M2 is asymptotically better than M1. Let a denote the desired (asymptotic) size of the test
and za=2 the value of the inverse standard normal distribution function evaluated at 1   a=2. If
Tn <  za=2, we reject H0 in favor of H1; if Tn > za=2, we reject H0 in favor of H2; Otherwise, we
accept H0:
There are two estimation approaches. The rst estimation approach is to estimate the demand and
supply sides in sequence. The second estimation approach to estimate them jointly. Correspondingly
there are also two ways to conduct the non-nested test.
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8.1.1 A non-nested test on the supply side
If we estimate the demand side and the supply side in sequence, then for the nonnested test we only
use the moment conditions on the supply side as follows:
E[m()] = E[zs0(br   xss)] = 0;
where
zs is a vector of supply instruments,br is the recovered deposit return rate,
xs is a vector of independent variables for costs, and
s is a vector of cost parameters to be estimated.
The recovered deposit return rate, br, is a function of the estimates of price coe¢ cient, b and the
estimate of the nested logit parameter, b. Both b and b are estimated from the demand estimation,
and are treated as known variables in the nonnested test. So br are also known in the nonnested test.
Recall that the deposit return rate is specied as rj = 0 + r ln(regionsj) + a ln(agej) + !jm.
So xs = (1; ln(regionsj); ln(agej)) and s = (0; r; a):
The weighting matrix W is computed only from the supply instrument zs. That is to say, W =
1
n
zs0zs:
Suppose that we want to choose between two models: M1 and M2. The moment conditions are
m1(b1) = zs0(br1   xs bs1);
m2(b2) = zs0(br2   xs bs2)
wherebr1 is the recovered deposit return rate from models M1,br2 is the recovered deposit return rate from models M2,bs1 and bs2 are the estimates of the supply parameters from models M1 and M2 respectively.
Then we can compute the nonnested test statistics, Tn:
If Tn <  za=2, then we conclude that M1 is asymptotically better than M2 at signicant level a.
If Tn > za=2, then we conclude that M2 is asymptotically better than M1 at signicant level a.
Otherwise, we conclude that M1 and M2 are asymptotically equivalent at signicant level a.
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8.1.2 A non-nested test on both the demand and supply sides
If we estimate the demand side and the supply side jointly, then for the non-nested test we use both
the moment conditions on the demand and supply sides as follows:
E[m()] = E
"
zd0(   xdd)
zs0(r   xss)
#
= 0;
where
zd is a vector of demand instruments,
 is a vector of the mean utility,
xd is a vector of observed product characteristic variables without random coe¢ cients, and
d is a vector of cost parameters to be estimated.
In the nested logit model, the mean utility can be computed directly from j = ln(sj)  ln(s0) 
 ln(sj=g)   pj and xd = (1; x). Or we can compute the mean utility from j = ln(sj)   ln(s0)  
 ln(sj=g) with xd = (1; p; x).
We can rewrite the moment conditions as
E[m()] = E[Z 0(Y  X)] = 0;
where
Y =
0BBBBBBB@
1
r1
...
n
rn
1CCCCCCCA
; X =
0BBBBBBB@
xd1 0
0 xs1
...
...
xdn 0
0 xsn
1CCCCCCCA
; Z =
0BBBBBBB@
zd1 0
0 zs1
...
...
zn 0
0 zsn
1CCCCCCCA
;
 =
 
d
s
!
, and  = (; ; ):
 is a vector of all linear parameters.  is a function (numerical) of price coe¢ cient, , and the
nested logit parameter, . r is a function of  and . So Y is a function of  and . The parameters
of the whole model, , should include ,  and .
For each pairwise comparison, there are two competing models, M1 and M2. The moment condi-
tions are
m1(b1) = Z 0(Y1  X b1);
m2(b2) = Z 0(Y2  X b2)
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where
Y1(c1; b1) =
0BBBBBBB@
b1br1
...bnbrn
1CCCCCCCA
1
; Y2(c2; b2) =
0BBBBBBB@
b1br1
...bnbrn
1CCCCCCCA
2
;
Y1 is a vector of the estimated mean utility and the recovered deposit return rate from modelM1,
Y2 is a vector of the estimated mean utility and the recovered deposit return rate from modelM2,b is a vector of the estimates of all demand and supply parameters except the estimate of price
coe¢ cient, b; and the estimate of the nested logit parameter, b, andb = (b; b; b) is a vector of all parameters in the model.
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